THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVISM
This discussion of the problem of relativism is drawn from a working paper titled The Major Problematics of Interdisciplinary Social Theory. (D. H. Bowles 2023)
There are four principal, persistent “problematics” (or more simply, “problems”) that recurrently present themselves for solution in interdisciplinary social theory. They are:
- The problem of human nature
- The problem of relativism
- The problem of distribution
- The problem of consciousness
Not surprisingly, the four problems are not independent of one another, but are inter-related. The purpose here is to provide a conceptual introduction to each of these problems in turn, followed by a brief introduction to the ‘global social theory’ framework for the comparative analysis of interdisciplinary social theory paradigms.
For discussion of the problem of relativism, it will be helpful to begin with a review of the meta-theoretical categories in which all social theory is grounded.
Meta-theoretical (Philosophical) Dimensions
When we embark upon any journey into the abstract realm of social theorizing, we necessarily make certain philosophical assumptions, or commitments. These commitments are not the objects of our theorizing; they constitute its predicates, and they fall into three categories:
- ontology, or the theory of reality. Ontological commitments attempt to provide an answer to the that famous (or infamous) exemplary philosophical question: what is reality? Or, what is real? what really exists? What does it mean, to say that something exists? The answers to those questions constitute the “object of study” for any theoretical enterprise.
- epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Epistemological commitments provide answers to fundamental questions like: what is true? what does it mean to claim that we “know” something? what are the criteria of belief, the rules of evidence for claims of knowledge?
- axiology, or the theory of value. Axiological commitments provide the basis for our processes of valuation, for deciding what things are more or less important to us, for making both moral and aesthetic choices.
As noted earlier, within any given theoretical framework, these commitments are not independent of one another, and together they constitute the philosophical foundations, or meta-theoretical paradigm, that will be found embedded (either explicitly or implicitly) in any and all social theory.
In our discussion of the problem of relativism, we will be talking about moral ontology, and moral epistemology, both of which are examples of how these commitments are interdependent. In these two examples, axiological commitments are dependent on, or at least are related to, ontological or epistemological ones.
Moral Ontology and Moral Epistemology
When we refer to a moral ontology, what we mean is that moral principles (duties or obligations) exist in reality because they are grounded in the actual existence of something real. One very common example of this would be the idea that moral duties exist in reality because they are manifestations of the will of God. Another example would be the claim that ontological individuality and its associated rights (rights are a special, reciprocal category of moral duties) exist as an integral part of human nature, whether that nature originates in the will of God or in the natural processes of evolution. Both of these ontological positions inform a derived moral ontology–a set of moral principles that is grounded in reality, in something real.
Moral epistemology, on the other hand, is exclusively a product of the process of human reasoning, where moral principles (duties, obligations, rights) have no independent ontological antecedent, but are derived exclusively from logically developed premises and arguments. This makes moral epistemology a strictly idealist exercise (i.e. a product of human ideation, cognition, or thought), whereas moral ontology can be regarded as realist in character as a consequence of its grounding in some kind of ontological reality. We will see as the discussion proceeds that epistemologically grounded (idealist) moral claims are significantly weaker than ontologically grounded (or realist) ones.
Pre-modern Moral Ontology: the Moral Imperative of Power
In our preceding discussion of the problem of human nature, we characterized pre-modern social ontology in the following way:
Pre-modern social ontology entails what can be called the authoritarian view of human nature. Human society exists in virtue of its collective group identity, as derived from spiritual authority. Assertion of individual identity and interest is suppressed, enforced by social norms and a temporal authority whose legitimacy is derived from the spiritual authority. The literal existence (survival) of the social group is simultaneously dependent on the cohesion of its social identity and its associated competitive prowess. The assertion and pursuit of individual interest at the group’s expense is viewed as moral transgression.
The substantive character of pre-modern moral ontology derived from authoritarian social ontology can be summarily stated as the moral imperative of power:[1]
The Good must be Strong; otherwise, how will it prevail?
In other words, the Good, however it may otherwise be defined, must entail the imperative to be physically Strong, or powerful. Otherwise, the social group will not be able to maintain its independence, or even survive, in a dangerous, competitive, predatory world.
However, the moral imperative of power is insufficient on its own terms. There is a corollary:
The Strong must also be Good; otherwise Might will be Right[2] and corruption or evil will prevail.
To state this in other words as well, the definition of Strong must include both physical and moral strength, and society’s concept of the Good (whatever its source or substance) must entail more than the simple imperative to be physically strong.
An excellent illustration of the application of both the moral imperative of power and its corollary is found in the climactic scene of the 1992 feature film A Few Good Men ( Columbia Pictures Corporation, Directed by Rob Reiner, Screenplay by Aaron Sorkin):
Relevant cast of characters:
Private First Class William T. Santiago (Michael DeLorenzo), assigned to Rifle Company Winward, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, subjected to an informal disciplinary “Code Red” resulting in his accidental death
Colonel Nathan R. Jessep (Jack Nicholson), Commanding Officer, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, who ordered the Code Red, against regulations, on Santiago
Lance Corporal Harold Dawson (Wolfgang Bodison) and Private First Class Louden Downey (James Marshall), charged with carrying out Jessup’s order and now on trial for the murder of Santiago
Lieutenant JG Daniel Kaffee (Tom Cruise), US Navy JAG Corps, defense attorney for Dawson and Downey in court‐martial proceedings brought against them as a result of their role in Santiago’s death
Scene: the climactic testimony of Col. Jessep, called as a witness for the defense
Jessep: You want answers?!
Kaffee: I want the truth!
Jessep: You can’t handle the truth! Son, we live in a world that has walls and those walls need to be guarded by men with guns. Who’s gonna do it? You?
I have a greater responsibility than you can possibly fathom. You weep for Santiago and curse the Marines; you have that luxury. You have the luxury of not knowing what I know: that Santiago’s death, while tragic, probably saved lives and that my existence, while grotesque and incomprehensible to you, saves lives.
You don’t want the truth because deep down in places you don’t talk about at parties you want me on that wall, you need me on that wall. We use words like honor, code, loyalty. We use them as the backbone of a life spent defending something. You use them as a punch line. I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain myself to a man who rises and sleeps under the blanket of the very freedom I provide and then questions the manner in which I provide it .[emphasis mine] I would rather you just said “Thank you,” and went on your way. Otherwise, I suggest that you pick up a weapon and stand a post.
Kaffee: Did you order that Code Red?!
Jessup: I did what I had to do!
Kaffee: Did you order that Code Red?!
Jessup: You’re damn right I did!
Following scene: Anti‐climactic exchange between Dawson and Downey following the verdict in which they were acquitted of murder, but convicted of “conduct unbecoming,” and sentenced to dishonorable discharge. Jessep has just been taken into custody to face charges connected with his original abuse of power‐‐ordering the Code Red against regulations‐‐and his subsequent perjury, intended to conceal his issuance of that order and to slough off all responsibility for Santiago’s death on Dawson and Downey.
Downey (indignant): What did we do wrong? We did nothing wrong.
Dawson (with insight, remorse): Yeah, we did. We’re supposed to fight for the people who can’t fight for themselves. We were supposed to fight for Willie.
Moral: the Good must be Strong, but the Strong must also be Good.
Modern Moral Ontology: the Moral Imperative of Individual Autonomy
As the modern world began to emerge from the medieval period, a new view of human nature developed to inform a radically different kind of ontological commitment in modern social theory:
Modern social ontology articulates and embraces a radical new libertarian view of human nature. Society is constituted by the “social contract” of autonomous, rational, self-interested individuals who yield a degree of autonomy to the social group to provide for the necessity of collective security. Excessive claims of the priority of group interests over individual self-interest and autonomy are regarded as morally dubious.
The substantive character of modern moral ontology that derives from libertarian social ontology can be stated in summary fashion as the moral imperative of individual autonomy. In libertarian political and social philosophy, this has also been called the maximal right to life: the right of an individual to live their life–to the greatest extent possible–according to their own choices. It is sometimes also characterized as the principle of “self-ownership.” The moral imperative of individual autonomy, or the maximal right to life, must be socially operationalized by a codified set of civil, political, and property rights.
It is at precisely this moment in history that the problem of relativism first appears. Assertion of the individual’s maximal right to life, according to the dictates of his or her own conscience, together with a prohibition on the “establishment of religion,” relegates submission to any parochial religious authority to the status of individual choice. This aspect of the problem of relativism is frequently referred to simply as moral relativism. Here we will also characterize it as axiological relativism, to later distinguish it from ontological and epistemological relativism, which remain to be introduced.[3]
However, it is very important to observe at this juncture that the moral (or axiological) relativism introduced with the modern libertarian view is a limited, or constrained relativism. What remains crucially non-relative is the moral imperative of individual autonomy, ontologically grounded in the libertarian view of universal human nature. It is this moral imperative that provides an ontological ground for claims of universal, trans-historical, trans-cultural, global human rights.
Finally, in this discussion of modern social ontology and the libertarian view of human nature, it remains to point out that the modern view does not summarily reject authoritarian moral ontology (the moral imperative of power). Instead, it is retained and subsumed–modified and constrained by the assertion of the moral imperative of individual autonomy and the maximal right to life.
Post-modern Moral Epistemology
In discussion of the problem of human nature, post-modern social ontology, informed by what we called the utopian view of human nature was described as follows:
Post-modern social ontology reasserts the pre-modern ontological priority of group identity and interest as variously constituted by spiritual and temporal authority. However, that authority is seen to be not absolute, but relative from one parochial society or social group to another. Ideas of a fixed human nature are viewed as socially variable, and the modern libertarian view of human nature is regarded as “socially constructed.” We call this the post-modern, utopian view of human nature.
Like moral epistemology, post-modern social ontology is essentially idealist in character. Social reality is held to exist in virtue of shared concepts, language, norms, relations, and culture. It is a variable product of human ideation, not grounded in any deterministic, universal ontological human qualities, and it is utterly malleable. In this view, we proceed from axiological (moral) relativism in the modern view, to ontological relativism. Ontological relativism is also frequently called cultural relativism.
Without any real ontological ground, post-modern social ontology cannot be said to offer any derivative moral ontology. Instead, any moral claims asserted in the post-modern view must be epistemologically derived. And, as noted earlier, epistemologically derived moral claims are implicitly weaker than ontologically grounded ones.
Without an ontological ground, moral epistemology in post-modern social theory tends to gravitate toward the consequentialist (utilitarian) rather than the deontological, in which the consequences of action rather than its inherent nature determine its moral quality.
Now, remember how in our earlier discussion of modern social and moral ontology we observed that it was the moral imperative of individual autonomy, informed by the libertarian view of human nature, that provided a strong ontological grounding for the assertion of global human rights? It is also very important to note here that from within a post-modern social theoretic framework, global assertion of a deontological set of human rights must by necessity be epistemologically derived rather than ontologically grounded, idealist rather than realist in character. And, as noted, idealist (or epistemologically derived) moral claims are significantly weaker than realist (ontologically grounded) ones. As a result, such human rights claims may rather easily be subsumed under the moral imperative of power (or authority), rather than constraining it.
The Moral Burden of Authority
Not to put too fine a point on things here at the conclusion, but there is one case in which the moral imperative of power (or authority) appropriately subsumes that of individual autonomy: when temporal authority is required to make choices for the benefit of some individuals–or for society as a whole–that will result in harm to other individuals. This is by definition a consequentialist, or utilitarian calculation: the greatest good for the greatest number. The implementation of such choices required of a moral agent in a position of authority are inevitably corrosive to a morally sensitive individual conscience. We call this the moral burden of authority, and it is the source of the underlying truth in Lord Acton’s famous adage, “Power corrupts.” A careful reading of Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532) will reveal that it is articulation of the moral burden of authority with which he is concerned there, not (as it is frequently portrayed) with the justification of unbridled personal corruption and abuse of power. (For a definitive example of the latter, refer again to Redbeard 1896.)
Epistemological Relativism: On the Edge of the Abyss
It remains for us to briefly discuss the final stage in the problem of relativism: epistemological, or radical relativism. In post-modern social theory, ontological relativity eventually devolves into epistemological relativity as an argument begins to emerge claiming that social science and social theory is just one among many different social and cultural realities, constituted by its own language, conceptual structure, norms, relations, and culture. As that radical argument gains traction among post-modern social theorists, even asserting the possibility of trans-historical, trans-cultural social theory and science becomes problematic.
Footnotes
[1] The term moral imperative in this usage is employed simply as a somewhat more emphatic and perhaps colorful synonym for the ethical construct of moral duty or obligation.
[2] For further insight into the implications of this, see Might is Right or Survival of the Fittest, published in 1896 under the pseudonym Ragnar Redbeard.
[3] See Rom Harre (1995) Varieties of Relativism for a full explication of these.
What is ‘Global’ Social Theory?
Download working paper: The Major Problematics of Interdisciplinary Social Theory (D. H. Bowles 2023). See paper for References.