THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN NATURE
This discussion of the problem of human nature is drawn from a working paper titled The Major Problematics of Interdisciplinary Social Theory. (D. H. Bowles 2023)
There are four principal, persistent “problematics” (or more simply, “problems”) that recurrently present themselves for solution in interdisciplinary social theory. They are:
- The problem of human nature
- The problem of relativism
- The problem of distribution
- The problem of consciousness
Not surprisingly, the four problems are not independent of one another, but are inter-related. The purpose here is to provide a conceptual introduction to each of these problems in turn, followed by a brief introduction to the ‘global social theory’ framework for the comparative analysis of interdisciplinary social theory paradigms.
We begin with the problem of human nature. To explain what we mean with reference to this problem, a little preliminary conceptual groundwork must be laid.
Meta-theoretical (Philosophical) Dimensions
When we embark upon any journey into the abstract realm of social theorizing, we necessarily make certain philosophical assumptions, or commitments. These commitments are not the objects of our theorizing; they constitute its predicates, and they fall into three categories:
- ontology, or the theory of reality. Ontological commitments attempt to provide an answer to the that famous (or infamous) exemplary philosophical question: what is reality? Or, what is real? what really exists? What does it mean, to say that something exists? The answers to those questions constitute the “object of study” for any theoretical enterprise.
- epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Epistemological commitments provide answers to fundamental questions like: what is true? what does it mean to claim that we “know” something? what are the criteria of belief, the rules of evidence for claims of knowledge?
- axiology, or the theory of value. Axiological commitments provide the basis for our processes of valuation, for deciding what things are more or less important to us, for making both moral and aesthetic choices.
Within any given theoretical framework, these commitments are not independent of one another, and together they constitute the philosophical foundations, or meta-theoretical paradigm, that will be found embedded (either explicitly or implicitly) in any and all social theory.
In social theory, ontological questions are concerned with the problem of social ontology. Is “society” real? What is “society” as an object of study? What is the constitution of society?
Now, we can return to discussion of the problem of human nature. As it turns out, the problem of human nature in the context of social theory is essentially identical to the problem of social ontology. How is this so?
Social Ontology in Modern Social Theory
What we frequently call the modern era begins with the emergence of science in the medieval European Renaissance period, displacing the authority of the Judeo-Christian Roman Catholic church with new epistemological commitments to the validity and superiority of knowledge gained via rational thought and empirical inquiry. The displacement of Judeo-Christian epistemological authority by science led gradually to the erosion of its ontological and axiological authority over ideas about the divinely ordained organization of society as well.
By the time of the 18th century Enlightenment, we find the emergence of modern social theory in the early academic fields of moral philosophy and political economy. Adam Smith provided the first systematic statement of early modern social theory, grounded in a radical new view of human nature that asserted the ontological priority of rational, autonomous individual identity and interest. In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith constructs a compelling argument that social arrangements allowing the unfettered pursuit of individual self-interest in property (i.e. wealth) would not shred social cohesion but would instead, under the benign guidance of what he called an “invisible hand,” lead to the long-run growth of wealth and prosperity for society as a whole.
In the same year that Smith published Wealth of Nations, the Declaration of Independence of the British colonies of North America valorized the principle of unalienable individual civil and political rights. Conjoined with Smith’s argument for untrammeled individual property rights, this cemented a shift in emerging modern social theory to a radically new social ontology of individual identity, interest, and rights grounded in the new view of rational, autonomous individual human nature.
Pre-modern Social Ontology
Prior to this ontological shift in emerging modern social theory, the idea of individual identity and interest grounded in some kind of natural order was essentially unknown in human society. The pre-modern social ontology of human society was universally oriented to group identity and interests as a whole. In the pre-modern view, group interest is elevated and valorized above that of the individual, and individual interest is given little or no moral weight by society as a whole. The pursuit of individual interest under such conditions was viewed as moral transgression. This kind of social order was invariably enforced with recourse to some kind of supernatural authority that would dictate the establishment of social norms and legitimize political authority.
Social Ontology and Moral Ontology
At this point, we can readily see that the meta-theoretical position taken with regard to social ontology entails the axiological dimension as well, which is also commonly referred to as a moral ontology. It also becomes readily apparent that the radical shift in modern social theory from group to individual ontology also entails an equally radical 180 degree shift from the valorization of group identity and interest to the moral elevation of autonomous individuality.
Post-modern Social Ontology
In the early 19th century, Auguste Comte formulates a doctrine that comes to be known as positivism, in which he calls for the development of a “science of society” modeled on the demonstrable success of the natural sciences. Comte’s vision exerts considerable influence on Emile Durkheim (1895), who is credited with formal establishment of the academic discipline of positivist sociology toward the end of the 19th century. But Durkheim rejects the social ontology of individual identity and interest embedded in the origins of modern social theory by the advocates of early political economy, and reasserts a social ontology of group identity and interest. Further developments in the field of sociology pioneered by Max Weber reject the positivism of Comte and Durkheim, and turn to a hermeneutic, or interpretive meta-theoretic model.
That model (despite Weber’s own commitment to an individualist ontology adopted from the field of political economy) eventually sustains what could be characterized as a post-modern social ontology, rejecting the modern view of individual, rational, self-interested, autonomous human nature, and reasserting the ontological priority of group identity and interest as the definitive characteristic of human nature, and the primary determinant of individual behavior.
Structure vs. Agency
One reason the problem of social ontology is so fundamental in social theory can be understood in terms of what is frequently referred to as the structure vs. agency debate. It’s importance has to do with the fundamental theoretical issue of the direction of causality. The terms structure and agency represent the theorized causal efficacy of either the group, or social unit, vs. that of the individual. Is individual human behavior conditioned by society (i.e. social structure: group identity, social norms, institutions, class strata, etc.) or is it driven by the autonomous decision-making capabilities of individual agents, with society as the object of influence? Obviously, the answer to this question is central to the social theoretic enterprise.
This debate has been ongoing in social theory at least since Durkheim’s 19th century rejection of the ontology of autonomous individuality adopted in 18th century political economy, and his reassertion of the ontological priority of group identity and interest. It has seen a number of iterations over the ensuing decades.
Social Ontology and the Problem of Human Nature
The problem of social ontology in the social sciences is no closer to resolution today than it has ever been. An enduring tension exists between individualist and collectivist views. In the historical typology of competing ontological views described here, each position is grounded in its own characteristic view of human nature:
- Pre-modern social ontology entails what can be called the authoritarian view of human nature. Human society exists in virtue of its collective group identity, as derived from spiritual authority. Assertion of individual identity and interest is suppressed, enforced by social norms and a temporal authority whose legitimacy is derived from the spiritual authority. The literal existence (survival) of the social group is simultaneously dependent on the cohesion of its social identity and its associated competitive prowess. The assertion and pursuit of individual interest at the group’s expense is viewed as moral transgression.
- Modern social ontology articulates and embraces a radical new libertarian view of human nature. Society is constituted by the “social contract” of autonomous, rational, self-interested individuals who yield a degree of autonomy to the social group to provide for the necessity of collective security. Excessive claims of the priority of group interests over individual self-interest and autonomy are regarded as morally dubious.
- Post-modern social ontology reasserts the pre-modern ontological priority of group identity and interest as variously constituted by spiritual and temporal authority. However, that authority is seen to be not absolute, but relative from one parochial society or social group to another. Ideas of a fixed human nature are viewed as socially variable, and the modern libertarian view of human nature is regarded as “socially constructed.” We call this the post-modern, utopian view of human nature.
Social Ontology, Moral Ontology, and the Problem of Relativism
You may note that in the historically emergent typology of social ontologies detailed above, the associated moral ontology of each view moves from a pre-modern moral absolutist position in the direction of a radical post-modern relativism. This brings our discussion directly to the next of the four social theory problematics under consideration: the problem of relativism.
What is ‘Global’ Social Theory?
Download working paper: The Major Problematics of Interdisciplinary Social Theory (D. H. Bowles 2023). See paper for References.